The philosophical significance of Cox's theorem  by Colyvan, Mark
The philosophical signiﬁcance
of Cox’s theorem
Mark Colyvan *
Department of Philosophy, University of Queensland, Brisbane, Qld. 4072, Australia
Received 1 June 2002; received in revised form 1 July 2003; accepted 1 November 2003
Available online 31 December 2003
Abstract
Cox’s theorem states that, under certain assumptions, any measure of belief is iso-
morphic to a probability measure. This theorem, although intended as a justiﬁcation of
the subjectivist interpretation of probability theory, is sometimes presented as an
argument for more controversial theses. Of particular interest is the thesis that the only
coherent means of representing uncertainty is via the probability calculus. In this paper
I examine the logical assumptions of Cox’s theorem and I show how these impinge on
the philosophical conclusions thought to be supported by the theorem. I show that the
more controversial thesis is not supported by Cox’s theorem.
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1. Introduction
Benacerraf [6] once warned that when philosophical conclusions are argued
from formal mathematical results, one should look very carefully at the
assumptions of the arguments in question. For any such argument cannot rest
on the formal result alone; there must be some philosophical premise, and this
is often illicitly smuggled through the back door. Benacerraf is not suggesting
that one can never draw philosophical conclusions from formal results, or that
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all such arguments are ﬂawed––just that it is important to identify the often
suppressed philosophical premises and to assess their plausibility. I think this is
very good advice and with this advice in mind I wish to examine the formal
result known as Cox’s theorem. This theorem states that, under the assump-
tions of the theorem, any measure of belief is isomorphic to a probability
measure [9,10]. The theorem has been used to support a variety of philo-
sophical conclusions, ranging from a justiﬁcation of the Bayesian approach to
probability, to a more radical thesis that probability is the only coherent
representation of uncertainty. In particular, I will examine the logical under-
pinnings of the theorem––classical propositional calculus––and show that, in
certain contexts at least, these logical assumptions are hard to defend. This, in
turn, undermines the more radical philosophical theses that the theorem might
be thought to support. I begin by discussing a kind of uncertainty for which
classical logic is inappropriate.
2. Belief and non-epistemic uncertainty
Agents typically do not believe propositions to degree one or zero. Belief
comes in degrees. This is because there is typically uncertainty about the truth
value of the proposition in question. Good epistemic agent recognise this and
set about quantifying the extent of the uncertainty and/or their degree of
certainty. Providing the details of a representation of reasoning carried out by
human (or more commonly, ideal) agents operating under uncertainty is often
referred to as the project of delivering the logic of plausible inference. 1 It is
usually assumed that uncertainty arises because of incomplete information––it
is simply an epistemic matter. I will argue that this is not the case. Some
uncertainty may remain even when the agent is in possession of all the relevant
data. This is bad news for classical logic and classical probability theory.
There are two ways in which an agent can be uncertain about the state of a
system. The ﬁrst is familiar. This is where there is uncertainty about some
underlying fact of the matter: System S is either in state r or it is not, but agent
A does not know which. A might be in possession of some probabilistic
information about the state of S––either numerical (‘‘the probability that S is in
state r is x’’) or non-numerical (‘‘it is more likely that S is in state r than not’’).
Call this epistemic uncertainty. Now compare this with a second, quite diﬀerent
kind of uncertainty; uncertainty where there is no fact of the matter about
1 I share Shafer’s [48] concerns about the use of the term plausible’ here, but this term is well
entrenched in the literature, and since I can think of no better term, I’ll continue to use it. I stress
however, that I am using the term more broadly than is usual. I include any formal account of belief
and reasoning under uncertainty.
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whether system S0 is in state r0 or not. Indeed, here the uncertainty arises be-
cause there is no underlying fact of the matter. Call this second kind of
uncertainty non-epistemic uncertainty. The idea here is that, for reasons I’ll
discuss shortly, the system S0 is neither in state r0 nor not in state r0––S0 is not
in a determinate state with respect to r0. It follows that even an agent in
possession of all the relevant data will be uncertain as to the truth value of the
proposition S0 is in state r0’. (Or, equivalently, the agent will not know the
answer to the question Is S0 in state r0?’.)
It follows that if there are any instances of non-epistemic uncertainty, an
agent could not be in possession of probabilistic information in such cases.
After all, what would it mean to say that the probability that system S0 is in
state r0 is x when there is no fact of the matter about the state of S0? Classical
probability theory presupposes that there is an underlying fact of the matter.
To see this we need only consider one of the axioms of classical probability
theory:
PrðQ _ :QÞ ¼ 1:
This implies that the proposition Q _ :Q is certain (because it is a logical
truth). This axiom of probability theory is the probabilistic analogue of the
logical principle of excluded middle. It would thus seem that in any domain
where excluded middle fails, (classical) probability theory is an inappropriate
tool for representing uncertainty. 2
Now there are several candidates for such domains, none of which, admit-
tedly, are entirely uncontroversial. To start with, consider ﬁctional discourse.
In a work of ﬁction such as H.G. Wells’ The Time Machine there is nothing
more to the story than what is written (and perhaps the logical and natural
implications of what is written). There is no fact of the matter about details not
in the story. So, for example, in the 1960 movie of the novel the time traveller
sets oﬀ for the future taking with him three books. What were the three books?
Well that’s (quite deliberately) not part of the story so (plausibly) there’s no
fact of the matter about what the three books were. It seems that classical
logic––in particular excluded middle––fails here. It is not true that either the
time traveller took or did not take Descartes’ meditations with him. Moreover,
the probability of this disjunction is not one (as standard probability theory
insists). Indeed, it seems quite misguided to talk of probabilities at all in such
cases. 3 I should add that this example is not as irrelevant to science as it might
2 See [7,13,14] for more on this issue.
3 Some might insist that the question about what the books were is meaningless, but this is very
hard to sustain. There is nothing ungrammatical about the sentence and the meaning is perfectly
clear. On what grounds is the case for the sentence’s meaningless to be based? I can think of none.
Indeed, the reason that some are inclined to call such questions meaningless is because they do
understand the meaning, see what the implications are, and only then deny that it has meaning.
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at ﬁrst seem. Science makes wide use of ﬁctional entities (like incompressible
ﬂuids, and Turing machines) and others that turn out to be ﬁctional (like the
planet Vulcan, which was supposed to have an orbit inside Mercury’s). And it
is clear that there are true propositions about such ﬁctions––the halting
problem is unsolvable’, for instance. So it would not do to dismiss ﬁctional
discourse as a mere philosophical curiosity. 4
Another example of a domain in which excluded middle might be thought to
fail is mathematics. Consider the status of Goldbach’s conjecture: all even
numbers greater than two can be written as the sum of two primes. At present
this conjecture has not been proven nor has its negation been proven. Now let
us suppose that you are a constructivist about mathematics. That is, you be-
lieve that P is true’ is just to say that P has a constructively respectable proof
from some constructively respectable set of axioms. It is well known that such
constructivists embrace intuitionistic logic where both double negation elimi-
nation and excluded middle fail [26]. But even non-constructivists may accept
that there are no-fact-of-the-matter propositions in mathematics. Take, for
example, an independent question of set theory such as the continuum
hypothesis. Neither this nor its negation is provable from the standard ZFC
axioms––it is provably independent of those axioms. Many non-constructivists
(for example, mathematical ﬁctionalists like Field [12]) also believe that at least
some independent statements are neither true nor false (and so it is not true
that such an independent statement or its negation holds).
A third example of where excluded middle might be thought to fail is in
domains where vague predicates are employed. Let us suppose that we wish to
know how many young people there are in a crowd. We might be uncertain
about this because there are some borderline cases. Take, for example, some-
one who is in their late 1920s. Do we count such a person as young or not?
There seems no deﬁnitive way to answer this question. The problem is that the
word young’ is vague (in the sense that it permits borderline cases). 5 There are
some well-known approaches to vagueness according to which excluded middle
holds––for example, Williamson’s [55] epistemic account of vagueness, the
4 See [20, pp. 70–73], [21, Chapter 7] and [40, pp. 128–131] for more on the logic and semantics
of non-denoting ﬁctional terms. Fictional discourse also raises problems at the level of predicate
logic. In classical predicate logic all names refer––even names like Vulcan’. Another deviation from
classical logic motivated by such considerations is free logic where ‘‘empty’’ names are permitted
(see [17,18,35,43]).
5 It is also context sensitive. But let us put that aside; let us assume that the context is ﬁxed. I
should also mention that vagueness is rather widespread in both natural language and in science so
it is unreasonable to dismiss it as another philosophical curiosity. See [44,45] for some of the
problems arising from vagueness in ecology and conservation biology.
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supervaluational account [15,51] and the paraconsistent approach [4,28,29].
Still, rejecting excluded middle remains a very plausible strategy. 6
Indeed, those who would like to apply probability theory to domains with
vague predicates should take little comfort from the above excluded-middle-
preserving approaches. For example, on what is generally thought to be the
leading contender among these approaches––the supervaluational account––
probabilities are still out of place. Although P _ :P is a theorem, if P is bor-
derline, P is usually thought to be neither true nor false. In either case, it seems
to make little sense to speak of the probability of P being true (when P is
borderline). On the paraconsistent approach, excluded middle is preserved at
the expense of (one sense of) the law of non-contradiction. That is, borderline
statements (such as a 28 year old is young’) are seen as both true and false.
That is, we have some true instances of P ^ :P . Those who ﬁnd giving up
excluded middle objectionable are unlikely to be happy with this. Williamson’s
epistemic approach (according to which there is an unknowable fact of the
matter concerning borderline cases) is the only option that would seem pal-
atable to defenders of the view that probability theory is appropriate in such
domains. The problem is that Williamson’s view is deeply unintuitive and ﬁnds
few supporters because of this. It would be inappropriate to try to settle the
matter of the correct account of vagueness here; I simply mention vagueness as
another very plausible source of non-epistemic uncertainty.
It is worth pausing for a moment to emphasise how vagueness gives rise to
uncertainty. Consider a scientiﬁc question such as how many species are there
in a given eco-system?’ Obviously there will be epistemic uncertainty associated
with this question but let us suppose that an agent is in possession of all the
relevant data. It turns out that even in possession of all the data, the answer to
the question may remain out of reach because of the vagueness of the scientiﬁc
terms eco-system’ and species’. The boundary of a eco-system will always
admit borderline cases. Less obvious, perhaps, is that the term species’ is va-
gue. Consider the possibility of a speciation event occurring at the moment that
the question is asked. Do we count the species in question as one or two? It is
also worth stressing that no further information can be brought to light that
will settle the matter. Perhaps we must settle for upper and lower bounds as the
answer to the question. In the example of a speciation event taking place, we
might give the interval ½n; nþ 1 as our answer. So we see that vagueness can
give rise to this peculiar kind of uncertainty––an uncertainty that cannot be
eliminated by gathering further data.
Now it might be argued that since the uncertainty in question here is
uncertainty about the truth value of a vague proposition, we can state the
problem classically in the meta-language. We can say that we do not know
6 See, for example, [19,22,34,42] for some of the approaches that abandon excluded middle.
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whether P (for some vague proposition P ) is true. Let v be the valuation
function (which maps from the domain of discourse D to the truth value set
TV ), then the problem is that of determining whether vðPÞ ¼ a, where a is a
particular truth value in TV . But, so the argument goes, vðP Þ ¼ a’ is either true
or false and so we have forged a link between non-epistemic uncertainty at the
object-language level and epistemic uncertainty at the meta-language level.
Indeed some do opt for a classical metalogic, but there is a case to be made for
non-classicality all the way up. A non-classical metalogic would be called for,
for instance, if there is higher-order vagueness. An adequate discussion of this
would take us too far a ﬁeld; I mention it merely to make the point that
non-epistemic uncertainty does not reduce to epistemic uncertainty in any
straightforward fashion. 7
So far I have argued that in domains where excluded middle fails, the
applicability of probability theory is highly questionable. The claim that
classical probability theory is the only coherent representation of uncertainty
suggests (among other things) that there are no domains about which we
reason with uncertainty, where excluded middle fails. On the face of it at least,
this is false: there are many such domains: there are ﬁctional domains, con-
structive domains and domains with vague predicates. Thus any defender of
classical logic needs to convince us that classical logic can, despite appearances,
cope with these problematic domains. This is a large (if not impossible) task,
for it involves, among other things, providing a classical account of ﬁctional
discourse, a defence of certain philosophical views about the philosophy of
mathematics (perhaps defending platonism) and a defence of something like
Williamson’s epistemic approach to vagueness. 8
Before I move on to a discussion of Cox’s theorem, let us consider a couple
of objections to my conclusion that probability theory is not appropriate for
non-epistemic uncertainty. The ﬁrst objection comes from quantum mechanics.
According to the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, there is
no fact of the matter about the state of certain quantum systems before a
measurement is made. But quantum theory itself provides us with probabilities
about the state of the system in question (see [27]), so it seems that we have a
7 See [55] for a discussion of higher-order vagueness.
8 Worse still, there would seem to be inconsistent domains about which we reason. I have in
mind here inconsistent mathematical theories (such as the early calculus and naive set theory) and
inconsistent scientiﬁc theories (such as the conjunction of general relativity and quantum
mechanics). Classical logic and classical probability theory are inappropriate in such domains since
in classical logic everything follows from a contradiction and in classical probability theory, all
contradictions have probability zero and all conditional probabilities conditional on a contradic-
tion are undeﬁned. Again if we reason about such domains, as we surely do, then it is clear that the
classical theories are inadequate. See [38] for some recent papers on inconsistency in science and
[37] for an account of a paraconsistent belief revision theory.
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counterexample to the claim that we cannot use probability theory unless there
is an underlying fact of the matter. The problem with this objection, however,
is that it confuses what the quantum mechanical probabilities are about. The
quantum mechanical probabilities are not about the state of the quantum
system in question before measurement; rather, the probabilities are usually
construed to be about the state of the system were it to be measured (or, if you
prefer, they might be construed to be about the measurements themselves––the
probability of the measurement turning out a particular way). Either way, the
probabilities are not construed as being about systems in indeterminate states.
The next objection concerns denotational failure. According to some (e.g.,
[49]), when there is failure of denotation, there is no fact of the matter about
the truth of the oﬀending sentence (i.e., the oﬀending sentence is truth-value-
less). Let us, for the sake of argument, accept this view. (Indeed, I have already
entertained ﬁctional discourse––which is one special kind of denotational
failure––as a source of non-epistemic uncertainty.) Suppose you see a male
colleague, whom rumour would have it was supposed to be having marital
problems, looking rather depressed and you speculate that his wife has left him.
You might even believe that this is the most likely explanation for his depressed
state. That is, you assign a subjective probability of greater than 0.5 to the
truth of the proposition My colleague’s wife has left him’. Now, as it turns out,
your colleague is not, nor has he ever been, married. We thus have a case of
denotational failure and so, by hypothesis, the sentence in question does not
take a truth value. But, it still seems sensible to attribute a probability of truth
to the sentence in question. 9 I agree that it seems sensible to entertain a
probability of truth for the sentence in question, but it is not clear that it is
sensible to do this on the view under consideration. After all, it also seems
sensible to say that the sentence in question is false (this was Russell’s [46]
view), and on this view it does make sense to talk of the probability of such
sentences being true. The issue is not whether it seems sensible to attribute
truth-value gaps to sentences that have non-referring terms and whether it
seems sensible to speak in terms of probability about these same sentences; the
issue is whether the latter is sensible given a commitment to the former. That is,
is it sensible to say, for instance, that some sentence is neither true nor false but
it is probably true? It would seem not, for this would commit one to a kind of
Moore’s paradox. 10
Now if it still seems sensible, on the view under consideration (i.e., the truth-
value-gap view), to talk about the probability of truth for sentences with non-
referring terms, it is because there is an implicit assumption that there is no
denotational failure. So, for example, the probability that your colleague’s wife
9 I thank Daniel Nolan for raising this objection.
10 This is the paradox of an agent asserting P but I don’t believe it’.
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has left him is something like the probability that his wife has left him, given
that he is married. If it turns out that he is not married, the probability in
question is the probability that his wife has left him, given that he is both
married and not married. This probability is undeﬁned. So even if it may seem
sensible on this view to talk about the probability of truth for sentences with
non-referring terms, it is not.
3. Coxs theorem and its assumptions
Thus far I’ve outlined two quite distinct sorts of uncertainty and argued that
only epistemic uncertainty is amenable to probabilistic treatment. Now I turn to
Cox’ theorem 11 and how the lessons of the last section impact on the philo-
sophical signiﬁcance of this theorem. Cox’s theorem can be stated as follows:
Theorem 1 (Cox). Any measure of belief is isomorphic to a probability measure.
The theorem is explicitly premised on the following assumptions: (i) belief is
a real-valued function (ii) an agent’s belief in :P is a function of his/her belief
in P and (iii) an agent’s belief in P ^ Q is a function of the agent’s belief in P
given Q and the agent’s belief in Q.
There has been a great deal of discussion on the assumptions of Cox’s
theorem and alternatives to these assumptions [7,11,23,24,48,52], but there has
been little if any discussion of the logical assumptions (or alternatives to these),
and yet these are crucial to understanding the signiﬁcance of the theorem. It is
those logical assumptions I now wish to examine.
The logical assumptions of the theorem are, of course, none other than
classical propositional logic, though very few state this explicitly and unam-
biguously. For example, Cox invokes ‘‘the algebra of symbolic logic’’ (italics
added). But even in Cox’s day there was more than one such logic. Jaynes [30]
tells us that the logic is ‘‘deductive logic’’. But again deductive logic’ is
ambiguous between the many logics deserving of this title. Elsewhere [31, p. 9]
Jaynes suggests that the logic is ‘‘two-valued logic or Aristotelian logic’’,
obviously thinking that classical (two-valued) propositional calculus and
Aristotelian logic are the same (which they are not). Others such as van Horn
[52] refer to the propositional calculus’ (italics added), again as though there
were only one such logic. 12 But what they all have in mind is quite clearly
11 There are, in fact, a number of theorems along similar lines (e.g., [1,2,8,16,25,36,39,52]). Cox’s
theorem [9,10], however, is undoubtedly the most well known and so I’ll be content to focus on it,
although I’ll often use the phrase Cox’s theorem’ to apply to the more general class of results.
12 Though in footnote 1 on [52, p. 5] van Horn suggests that we may also consider numerical
identity statements. This suggests that full (classical) ﬁrst-order logic is what is needed.
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classical propositional calculus. The problem is that none of them calls the
logic in question by name and so it is (at least initially) unclear what logic they
have in mind. Worse still, some suggest (e.g., by the use of the deﬁnite article
the’) that there is only one choice here. Those (like Jaynes [31]) who do point
out that there are other logics to choose from do not bother to defend the
choice of classical logic in any systematic fashion. 13
Combine this unclarity about the logic in question (or the number of can-
didate logics) with a very commonly held view that logic is domain indepen-
dent. 14 According to this view, the choice of logic does not depend on the
domain of application. 15 So if we combine this commonly held view about
logic with the view that ‘‘logic’’ is classical propositional logic (or ﬁrst-order
classical predicate calculus), then we are led to a view that classical logic is all
we need for deductive inferences on any domain. Again it is clear that some
commentators on Cox’s theorem hold such a view. Indeed, Van Horn states
this quite explicitly: ‘‘the propositional calculus is applicable to any problem
domain for which we can formulate useful propositions’’ (p. 11, italics in
original). Of course there is a sense in which Van Horn is right––classical
propositional logic is applicable to any domain, but that is not the issue. The
issue is whether classical propositional logic can be applied to any domain and
get the right answers. It is clear that it cannot. One needs only consider argu-
ments involving modality to see the inadequacy of classical propositional
logic. 16 VanHorn, of course, is not alone in holding such a view of logic, though
I have never seen anyone suggest that classical propositional calculus is the
universal logic––the usual candidates are classical ﬁrst-order logic or a exten-
sion of it such as S5 modal logic. But what I’m arguing here is that no classical
13 Jaynes does make some rather obscure comments by way of defence of classical propositional
logic. For instance, in a section of his book [31, p. 23] called Nitpicking’ Jaynes raises the
possibility of alternative logics and suggests that ‘‘[multiple-valued logics] can have no useful
content that is not already in two-valued logic; that is, that an n-valued logic applied to one set of
propositions is either equivalent to a two-valued logic applied to an enlarged set, or else it contains
internal inconsistencies.’’ It is not clear what he means by this, and the appendix where the
argument for this claim is supposed to be found is of no help. In any case, Jaynes seems to be
thinking of multi-valued logics as the only non-classical logics. As we have already seen, there are
others––for example, free logics.
14 This widely held view found a powerful advocate in Tarski [50].
15 In essence, this is a monist or one-size-ﬁts-all view of logic, as opposed to a more pluralist
horses-for-courses view. See [5,41] for discussion on the monism–pluralism debate.
16 Consider the argument from there is uncertainty’ to possibly there is uncertainty’. This
argument is clearly valid and yet the validity cannot be demonstrated by classical propositional
calculus, because the only way to formalise this argument in this logic is as P therefore Q which is
invalid. To demonstrate the validity of such arguments, modal logic is required. See [18] for a good
introduction to modal logics and their applications.
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logic is up to this task. Classical logic simply fails in some domains in which we
routinely perform logical inferences.
Cox’s theorem, if it is to demonstrate the adequacy of probability theory for
plausible reasoning across all domains, it must be derivable from assumptions
that are not domain speciﬁc. But as I’ve already argued, classical logic is do-
main speciﬁc. Or at least, we have been oﬀered no argument to the eﬀect that it
is not. All we are typically given are rather casual acceptances of classical
propositional calculus as though there were no other, or, at least, no other
worthy of serious consideration. So what is delivered is not a logic of plausible
reasoning, simpliciter, instead we have a logic of plausible reasoning that is
defensible only when there is no referential failure, vagueness or the like. Now
perhaps this is all some commentators have in mind––a limited-scope logic of
plausible reasoning. If this is the case, then this limitation needs to be stressed.
But it is clear that not all contributors to the literature on Cox’s theorem have
such a modest project in mind. 17 Again Van Horn states this point of view
very clearly: ‘‘recall the purpose of this enterprise: to construct a universal
system or logic of plausible reasoning’’ (p. 11, again emphasis in original). My
point is simply that if the enterprise is, as Van Horn suggests, that of con-
structing a universal system, it had better not rest on classical logic. On the
other hand, if the enterprise is the more modest one suggested above, this needs
to be made clear.
Now let us turn brieﬂy to the question of whether the proof of the theorem
requires any of the contentious features of classical logic? What if, for instance,
the proof only relied on inferences and logical equivalences that are not con-
troversial in the context of the representation of belief––inferences such as
modus ponens and equivalences such as de Morgan laws? There is no need to
ponder such questions too long, for the standard proofs of Cox-style results
quite clearly rely on disputed logical principles. First, an example from Cox’s
original proof and then another example from a more recent proof. In Cox’s
proof that the belief in Q _ :Q is maximal, Cox quite explicitly assumes the
classical principle of double negation elimination: ::Q  Q. If we limit our
attention to epistemic uncertainty and exclude all forms of non-epistemic
uncertainty, then the assumption seems harmless. On the other hand, if we are
interested in uncertainty in the broadest sense (including constructive domains,
vague domains and so on) the assumption is highly controversial. 18 For a
more recent example I once again turn to Van Horn [52] who also uses double
negation elimination (in the proof of Proposition 2 on p. 11) and assumes, in
17 And I stress that this is a modest project, because vagueness is ubiquitous in both scientiﬁc
and everyday discourse. The limited-scope logic of plausible reasoning will thus be rarely applicable
outside pure mathematics.
18 Indeed, intuitionists deny this principle.
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the proof of Lemma 11 (on p. 20), that :B  ððA _ :BÞ ^ ð:A _ :BÞÞ. This last
assumption is very closely related to excluded middle. With the usual classical
assumptions in place about the distribution of _ over ^, 19 it amounts to
the assumption that A ^ :A is false, which under further (classical) assumptions
is equivalent to excluded middle. So at the end of the day, controversial fea-
tures of classical logic are assumed in the original proof of Cox’s theorem and
these assumptions remain in modern presentations.
The assumption of classical logic is particularly troublesome if Cox’s the-
orem is to be wielded as a weapon against non-classical systems of belief
representation. And, I should add, that some commentators do put Cox’s
theorem to such a purpose. For example, Lindley [36] draws the following
conclusion (from a similar theorem): ‘‘The message is essentially that only
probabilistic descriptions of uncertainty are reasonable’’ (p. 1) and Jaynes [31]
suggests that ‘‘the mathematical rules of probability theory [. . .] are [. . .] the
unique consistent rules for conducting inference (i.e., plausible reasoning) of
any kind’’ (p. xxii). 20 But Cox’s result is simply a representation theorem
demonstrating that if belief has the structure assumed for the proof of the
theorem, classical probability theory is a legitimate calculus for representing
degrees of belief. But as it stands it certainly does not legitimate only classical
probability theory as a means of representing belief, nor does it prove that such
a representation is adequate for all domains.
What are the alternatives then? What would these alternate belief theories
look like? If we want a probability theory for non-epistemic uncertainty, we
may wish to base it on a logic in which excluded middle fails. This means that
propositions of the form P _ :P would not automatically receive maximal
probability. There are a couple of ways of doing this. One approach would be
to allow tautologies to take probability assignments less than one. The other
approach is to underwrite the probability theory with a non-classical logic. In
this latter case, the tautologies of the non-classical logic will receive maximal
probability––it is just that classical tautologies such as P _ :P would not, in
general, get assigned the maximal value. 21 In some of the logics in contention,
there may be no tautologies (as is the case with Kleene’s three valued system
K3 and the most popular fuzzy logics [40]). If we use one of these as the
underlying logic, there would not be any logical truths and so there would not
be any propositions automatically assigned the maximal probability. Some
work has been carried out in these directions but there is much more to do.
19 Interestingly, distribution fails in quantum logics. So quantum logicians may contest the
logical equivalence that Van Horn relies on, but for slightly diﬀerent reasons. See [3] for an early
presentation of quantum logic.
20 Shafer [48] also notes (disapprovingly) this use of Cox’s theorem to rule against anything
other than standard probability theory.
21 See [54] for a constructive probability theory.
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4. Conclusion
Let me ﬁnish by noting a few points of contact between this paper and Glen
Shafer’s recent discussion of Cox’s theorem in this journal [48]. Shafer notes
that Cox’s theorem relies not only on its stated, explicit assumptions, but it also
relies on implicit assumptions––such as the assumption that belief should be
represented by a real-valued function. I note one other implicit (or at least
undefended) assumption––the use of classical propositional logic. Shafer’s
work on belief functions [47] casts doubt over the plausibility of the assump-
tion that belief is adequately represented by a real-valued function. 22 I’ve
pointed out that work in logic in the latter part of the 20th century casts doubt
over the plausibility of the assumption (used by Cox and others) that classical
logic is the appropriate logic to underwrite a formal theory of plausible rea-
soning.
The connection between this paper and Shafer’s runs even deeper. Not only
are both papers questioning implicit assumptions of Cox’s theorem. It turns
out that our concerns may well be two sides of the one coin. Although our
starting points are apparently quite diﬀerent––mine being logic, Shafer’s being
the representation of imprecise belief. It turns out that starting with concerns
such as mine (i.e., concerns about vagueness and other forms of non-epistemic
uncertainty), one very natural way of responding to these issues is to give up
the classical logical principle of excluded middle. This in turn naturally leads to
a non-classical belief theory that is very similar to Shafer’s. 23 In essence we are
both reject the unrealistic precision assumed by standard belief theory. Shafer
rejects the assumption that belief functions are real valued; I reject the logical
assumption of excluded middle.
Another point of contact is that Shafer stresses that the assumptions of
Cox’s theorem need to be more than merely plausible, they need to be self-
evident. He points out that both the explicit assumptions and the implicit
assumption that belief functions are real-valued fail in this regard. I concur and
I add one further assumption to this list of non-self-evident assumptions. In the
context of the representation of uncertainty classical logic is not self-evidently
the appropriate logic. Indeed, I think it is demonstrably not the appropriate
logic, but even if you disagree with me on this stronger claim, the fact remains
that classical logic is not self-evident. So those who would employ Cox-style
results for the purpose of providing a logic of plausible inference, need to ﬁrst
mount a defence of classical logic.
22 And I ﬁnd myself in full agreement with Shafer on this issue. See [32,53] and for other
approaches to abandoning the assumption that a single real number is adequate for characterising
belief.
23 See [13] for details.
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The ﬁnal point of contact between my discussion here and Shafer’s is that we
are both interested in widening the historical focus of the discussion of Cox’s
theorem. Shafer wants to draw to the attention of commentators on Cox’s
theorem the earlier work (by continental probability theorists) on the logical
interpretation of probability––frequentism and subjectivism are not, nor were
they in 1946 (when Cox wrote his paper), the only games in town. I wish to
bring to the discussion the issue of the underlying logic––classical logic is not,
nor was it in 1946, the only game in town. 24 I think a lot is to be gained by
considering these broader historical and, I might add, interdisciplinary per-
spectives. Once one does this, one sees that Cox’s theorem is an interesting
representation theorem that has prompted some fruitful debate, but ultimately
the theorem rests on some rather questionable assumptions about the structure
of human belief.
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